

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 BRASILIA 2764

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: OVIP (CARTER, JIMMY), BR
SUBJECT: DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION OF BILATERAL MEETING
BETWEEN SECRETARY VANCE AND FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA,
MARCH 29, 1978, 10:40 P.M.

1. PARTICIPANTS ON THE U.S. SIDE IN ADDITION TO SECRETARY VANCE WERE ASSISTANT SECRETARY TERENCE A. TODMAN, INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS; CHARGE RICHARD E. JOHNSON; DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANNING, ANTHONY W. LAKE; CLAUS W. RUSER, ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL COUNSELOR. THE BRAZILIAN SIDE WAS REPRESENTED BY FOREIGN MINISTER ANTONIO FRANCISCO AZREDO DE SILVEIRA; AMBASSADOR JOAO HERMES PEREIRA DE ARAUJO, CHIEF, DEPARTMENT OF THE AMERICAS; COUNSELOR JOSE NOGUEIRA FILHO, ADVISOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS; COUNSELOR RONALDO MOTA SARDENBERG, ADVISOR FOR BILATERAL AFFAIRS; AND COUNSELOR SEBASTIAO DO REGO BARROS, ADVISOR FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY.

2. AFTER A DISCUSSION OF SEVERAL OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS IN THE DRAFT PRESS COMMUNIQUE, SECRETARY VANCE SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW POINTS ABOUT AFRICA.

3. FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA SAID THAT AS A RESULT OF THE EARLIER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS THE BRAZILIAN SIDE FELT VERY MUCH UP-TO-DATE ON THE
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AFRICAN SITUATION. WHAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD PROPOSED BRAZIL WAS PREPARED TO DO; WHAT HE HAD SAID WAS VERY IMPORTANT. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD EXCHANGE PAPERS ON AFRICA. SILVEIRA SAID THE WESTERN WORLD WAS NOW PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE AFRICA'S FEELINGS; THE WEST WAS IN THE PROCESS OF GIVING A DIFFERENT STATUS TO A RACE THAT HAD NOT BEEN RECOGNIZED. AS FOR BRAZILIAN

POLICY, BRAZIL WAS READY TO ACCEPT THAT SOME OF THE AFRICAN STATES HAVE QUITE DIFFERENT SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS. BRAZIL WAS READY TO HAVE RELATIONS. IT HAD BEEN SAID THAT AFRICA WOULD CHANGE EUROPE; HE DID NOT BELIEVE THIS, EUROPE WOULD CHANGE AFRICA. THE WESTERN WORLD WAS NOT A GEOGRAPHIC ENTITY. IN THE BRAZILIAN VIEW AFRICA, JAPAN AND LATIN AMERICA ARE ALL PART OF THE WESTERN UNIVERSE. WE MUST TRY TO UNDERSTAND AFRICA.

4. SECRETARY VANCE SAID HE WISHED TO DISCUSS A BIT FURTHER THE SITUATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA.

5. FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA RECALLED BRAZIL'S ATTITUDE TOWARD AFRICAN PROBLEMS AS EXPRESSED EARLIER BY PRESIDENT GEISEL. THE SAME POSITION, HE SAID, HAD BEEN EXPRESSED TO THE FRG. WHAT HAD OCCURRED IN ETHIOPIA WAS A MAJOR RACIAL AND SOCIAL UPHEAVAL; THE BLACKS ARE NOW IN THE MAJORITY. HE RECALLED A DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT SENGHOR WHO HAD SAID THAT THE WEST SHOULD NOT BE OPPOSED TO THE ETHIOPIANS. SENGHOR HAD EXPRESSED THE CONVICTION THAT THE NEW TOP LEADER-

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SHIP WOULD NOT REMAIN PERMANENTLY WEDDED TO A MARXIST PRO-SOVIET/CUBAN OUTLOOK; IT WOULD CHANGE. FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA SAID BRAZIL AGREED THAT THE ETHIOPIANS SHOULD CHANGE THEIR PHILOSOPHY AND POLICIES AND THAT THE CUBANS AND SOVIETS SHOULD CEASE THEIR INTERFERENCE.

6. SECRETARY VANCE NOTED THAT THE ISSUE WAS THE OAU'S INEFFECTIVENESS IN PROMOTING A SETTLEMENT; HE ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS

ANYTHING WE COULD DO TO PUSH THE OAU INTO A MORE EFFECTIVE ROLE.

7. FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA SAID THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE OAU HAD TOO MANY COUNTRIES TO BE AN EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION.

8. SECRETARY VANCE WONDERED ABOUT NIGERIA'S ROLE. FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA SAID THE BRAZILIANS KNEW FOREIGN MINISTER GARBA WELL. HE, SILVEIRA, HAD HAD MANY DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM. OUTSIDERS HAD TO BE VERY CAREFUL IN DEALING WITH ARICA. THE ONLY WAY TO INFLUENCE THE OAU WAS TO HAVE THE COURAGE TO SELECT COUNTRIES WITH INFLUENCE IN THE ORGANIZATION AND WORK THROUGH THEM. NIGERIA HAD CHALLENGED THE OAU A NUMBER OF TIMES AND WON. DIRECT APPROACHES BY OUTSIDE POWERS WERE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. THE AFRICANS WERE TRAUMATIZED.
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THE ONLY EFFECTIVE WAY WAS TO WORK THROUGH COUNTRIES IN THE REGION.

9. THE SECRETARY ASKED ABOUT GABON'S CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE OAU. FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA SAID BRAZIL HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH GABON; BUT THE OAU'S CREDIBILITY, UNDER GABON'S CHAIRMANSHIP, IS VERY LOW.

10. SECRETARY VANCE NOTED THAT NIGERIA CHAIRS THE OAU COMMITTEE WHICH HANDLES THE ETHIOPIAN DISPUTE. HE WONDERED WHAT STRATEGY THE U.S. SHOULD FOLLOW TO ENCOURAGE NIGERIA AND THE COMMITTEE TO PLAY A MORE EFFECTIVE ROLE.

11. FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA SAID THE STRATEGY AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT HAD BEN TO TRY TO FREEZE THE CONFLICT. HE THOUGHT THIS WAS NOT ENOUGH.

12. SECRETARY VANCE SAID THE PROBLEM OF THE BORDERS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE SOVIETS AND WITH CUBA. WITH REGARD TO ERITREA, THE ANSWER MIGHT BE SOME FORM OF LOCAL AUTONOMY WITHIN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES. IN OUR VIEW THE OAU HAS TO TAKE THE LEADERSHIP ON THIS. THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE OAU SAYS IT WILL DO SOMETHING BUT NOTHING EVER HAPPENS.

13. FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA WONDERED ABOUT NIGERIA'S POSITION. ITS LEADERSHIP ROLE IS DECLINING. BRAZIL HAD GOOD RELATIONS WITH NIGERIA. IT EXPECTED NIGERIA TO PLAY A LEADING ROLE IN AFRICA. BUT NIGERIA WAS MORE THAN AN AFRICAN COUNTRY. IT REALLY WAS A MULTI-RACIAL SOCIETY, A COMPOSITE OF SEVERAL RACES

AND ETHNIC GROUPS. GABON WOULD NOT OPPOSE CUBA. THE
GABONESE LEADERSHIP DOES NOT FEEL IN DANGER BUT BELIEVES
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IT WOULD BE IN DANGER IF GABON OPPOSED ITSELF TO CUBA.

14. SECRETARY VANCE SAID WE WERE PLANNING TO HAVE
DISCUSSIONS WITH GABON.

15. FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA SAID HE DID NOT HAVE A
GREAT DEAL OF CONFIDENCE. GABON HAD HAD TOO MANY CHANGES
OF GOVERNMENTS. GABON MIGHT DO SOMETHING BUT IT WOULD
BE SOMETHING VERY ARTIFICIAL.

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16. FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA TURNED TO NAMIBIA.
THIS WAS A PROBLEM IN SLOW MOTION. THE AFRICAN STATES
WERE AFRAID TO COMPROMISE. A SETTLEMENT WOULD APPEAR
AS A COMPROMISE WITH SOUTH AFRICA. THE AFRICANS NO
LONGER TRUST THE UN COMMITTEE. THE POPULATION OF
THE TERRITORY WAS A PRIMITIVE PEOPLE WITH A TENDENCY
TOWARDS LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. THERE WAS ALSO
CHINA'S ROLE. BRAZIL WAS CONCERNED OVER NAMIBIA.

17. SECRETARY VANCE SAID THE GROUP OF FIVE HAD THE
SUPPORT OF THE FRONT-LINE STATES AS WELL AS THE SUPPORT
OF NIGERIA. SILVEIRA AGREED THAT THIS SUPPORT WAS VERY
IMPORTANT.

18. WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, SECRETARY VANCE CONTINUED, NEW PROPOSALS WOULD BE PUBLISHED. THE INTENTION WAS TO MAKE ONE LAST TRY WITH SWAPO. IF SWAPO AGREES, THE CONSULTATIVE GROUPS AGREE, AND THE FRONT-LINE STATES AGREE, THIS WOULD PUT PRESSURE ON SOUTH AFRICA. THE FIVE ARE TOGETHER ON THIS ARE AGREED. PRESIDENT NYERERE FEELS VERY STRONGLY THAT THE NAMIBIA PROBLEM SHOULD BE SOLVED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BEFORE THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM. THIS WOULD REDUCE THE OPPORTUNITIES OF CUBAN INTERFERENCE AND EXPLOITATION OF THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM. ON THE OTHER HAND, SWAPO MAY NOT GO ALONG WITH
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THE NEW PROPOSALS BECAUSE OF THEIR OWN POSITION IN RELATION TO THAT OF THE OTHER GROUPS. IF WE CANNOT BRING THE PARTIES TOGETHER, WE ARE PLANNING TO PUT THE ISSUE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND LET THE UN AND WORLD OPINION DEAL WITH IT. SECRETARY VANCE SAID HE WOULD BE ABLE TO GIVE SILVEIRA A BETTER ASSESSMENT AFTER THE MEETINGS IN LAGOS. WE WERE ANXIOUS TO MOVE THIS PROBLEM ALONG.

19. TURNING TO RHODESIA, SECRETARY VANCE SAID WE CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO THE BRITISH-AMERICAN PLAN AS THE BASIS OF A SETTLEMENT. THE SALISBURY PLAN, WHILE IT CONTAINS SOME USEFUL ELEMENTS, WAS INADEQUATE. ALL THE FRONT-LINE STATES ARE BACKING THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN. WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PUT TOGETHER ALL THOSE WHO ATTENDED THE MALTA MEETING. THERE WOULD BE A MEETING OF THE MALTA GROUP IN DAR ES SALAAM INCLUDING THE BRITISH AND US FOREIGN MINISTERS, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, AND THE FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS. IF THIS MEETING SHOULD WORK OUT, THIS WOULD BE THE DIRECTION IN WHICH WE WOULD BE MOVING. HE JUST WANTED TO MENTION THIS TO BRING BRAZIL UP TO DATE

20. TURNING TO THE MIDDLE EAST, SECRETARY VANCE NOTED THAT SADAT WOULD RECEIVE WEITZMANN WITHIN THE NEXT TWENTY-FOUR HOURS.

21. FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA INTERJECTED THAT WEITZMANN AND BEGIN DO NOT ALWAYS SEE THINGS EYE-TO-EYE.

22. IF BEGIN STAYS ON HIS PRESENT COURSE, SECRETARY VANCE CONTINUED, THERE WOULD BE NO SETTLEMENT. THE WINDOW WAS A VERY NARROW ONE. THERE WAS NOT A GREAT
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DEAL OF TIME.

23. FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA WONDERED ABOUT THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY.

24. SECRETARY VANCE SAID BEGIN'S POLICIES HAD CAUSED A GREAT DEAL OF DIVISIN. SADAT HAS SAID HE NEEDS A GENERAL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES THAT APPLY TO A GENERAL PEACE TREATY. HAVING ESTABLISHED THAT, HE CAN SAY TO HIS FELLOW ARABS THAT HE HAS DONE ALL HE CAN REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO DO. HE WOULD HAVE ESTABLISHED A PROPER FRAMEWORK FOR A SETTLEMENT; WITHOUT SUCH A FRAMEWORK HE CANNOT MAKE PEACE AND SURVIVE POLITICALLY.

25. FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA COMMENTED THAT THIS SHOULD BE EASY FOR ISRAEL BECUSE IT WOULD NOT WORK IN ANY EVENT.

26. SECRETARY VANCE SAID SADAT NEEDS THE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES TO JUSTIFY HIS POSITION BUT SUCH A STATEMENT WAS VERY HARD TO SELL IN ISRAEL. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY CONSISTENT WITH SUCH A STATEMENT OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

27. FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA ASKED WHY THE US HAD SAID THAT THE PALESTINIANS COULD NOT HAVE A SEPARATE COUNTRY. HE THOUGHT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE

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PALESTINIANS TRUST THE US. THEY HAD SUFFERED TOO MUCH. TO WIN CREDIBILITY, THE US MUST GIVE THEM

THE OPPORTUNITY OF A SEPARATE HOMELAND.

28. SECRETARY VANCE SAID THE ATTITUDE OF COUNTRIES LIKE SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN WAS QUITE DIFFERENT. THEY ALL WOULD PREFER NOT TO HAVE AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN NATION. THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE IS SOMETHING ISRAEL WILL EVER AC(EPT. IN TERMS OF THEIR OWN INTERESTS, THEY DO NOT WANT TO SEE AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINE BUT PREFER AN AFFILIATED STATE.

29. FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA INTERJECTED THAT IF THE US DOES NOT CONCEDE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINE, IT WILL LOSE CREDIBILITY. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE US ESTABLISH ITS CREDIBILITY WITH THE PALESTINIANS.

30. MR. LAKE NOTED THAT THE US HAD TALKED ABOUT A PALESTINIAN HOMELAND AND A VOICE FOR THE PALESTINIANS IN THEIR OWN FUTURE. IF A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES COULD BE AGREED, SADAT COULD MAKE PEACE WITH ISRAEL; THEN JORDAN MIGHT COME IN, PERHAPS ULTIMATELY EVEN SYRIA.

31. SECRETARY VANCE EMPHASIZED THAT THERE HAD TO BE
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SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS. WE WOULD FAVOR THAT SUCH SELF-DETERMINATION PROVIDE A LIMITED SERIES OF OPTIONS, INCLUDING (A) SELF-GOVERNMENT,(B) AFFILIATION WITH JORDAN, AND (C) AFFILIATION WITH ISRAEL. WE WOULD LEAVE OUT THE OPTION OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE.

32. FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS PROGRESS. SOME OF THE EARLIER US STATEMENTS HAD SOUNDED MORE LIKE A VETO. IN A YEAR OR TWO THE US MIGHT COME OUT IN FAVOR OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE. JOHNSON

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